

## *The President's Daily Brief*

*Sunday*  
6 September 1970

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~~Top Secret~~ 50X1

*Sunday 6 Sept 1970*

ORIG : SIG  
UNIT : OPS CTR  
EXT :  
DATE : 6 Sept 1970

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TO : THE WHITE HOUSE

IMMEDIATE

ROUTING

FROM : CIA OPERATIONS CENTER

SOURCE REF:

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(elite)

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(date and time filed)

(reference number)

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CITE

CIA OPS CENTER

TO

IMMEDIATE THE WHITE HOUSE

PLS PASS FOLLOWING TO THE PRESIDENT AT SAN CLEMENTE

HEREWITH PDB OF 6 SEPT.:

SIG CTR: + COPY FROM ATTACHED. RETURN ALL COPIES  
TO OPS CTR FOR PDB.

RELEASING OFFICER

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USSR/ISRAEL

The U. S. Embassy in Moscow has received a statement from the Soviet Foreign Office that the USSR has evidence of Israeli intentions to make air strikes along the Egyptian side of the Canal on 6 September. The note adds that the Soviets expect that firm U. S. influence will be used to restrain the Israelis from such an act.

We have no positive indications of our own that such a project is imminent. The Israeli assertions that such an action would be necessary if Egyptian ceasefire violations continue carry no sense of immediacy

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[REDACTED]

There are three possible explanations for the Soviet action:

1. The Soviets have good evidence which persuades them that Israel intends to attack.
2. The Soviets have flimsy evidence, or none at all, but think it useful at this point to alarm the U. S.
3. The Soviets invented the story to cover some imminent military action of their own.

The first explanation is doubtful. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the channel chosen by Moscow -- deputy chief of American Section to Embassy officer -- does not bespeak genuine and intense alarm.

The third explanation is equally doubtful. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] More generally, the USSR and Egypt have Israel in a serious political bind at the moment, and it would appear to be in their interest to keep Tel Aviv's feet to the fire, and even to throw on some extra fuel.

The second explanation is consistent with our evidence [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and with the channel employed. On this explanation, the USSR wants to draw U. S. attention to the one contingency which could upset current Soviet tactics and, by prodding

[REDACTED]

the U. S. into representations in Tel Aviv, to add to the inhibitions  
on this Israeli course of action.

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
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~~GROUP ONE ONLY~~

EGYPT



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cambodia

There were no new major Communist attacks during the past 24 hours. Enemy harassing activity increased slightly in the southern and western provinces and the Communists ~~xxx~~ also maintained some pressure on the government-held towns of Srang and Saang, south of Phnom Penh. <sup>✓</sup>Sveral government positions near Siem ~~Ra~~ Reap town were hit by the enemy, but few casualties resulted.

In Saigon, Foreign Minister Lam has announced that his government will call for a second Djakarta Conference to resolve the Cambodian problem. Lam explained that the time is propitious for some action to follow up the ~~in~~ "spirit of Djakarta." Lam's timing may be correct, but a second conference would ~~be~~ be easire to sellif one of the neutral countries promoted it.

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FBIS 02

PALESTINE RESISTANCE STATEMENT

AMMAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ARABIC 1200 GMT 5 30 70 M

(TEAT) WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING: THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT HAS ISSUED A STATEMENT ON THE REGRETTABLE INCIDENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. THE STATEMENT SAYS THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, WHICH HAS BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT THE FREEDOM AND SAFETY OF THE CITIZENS AND HAS EXERCISED SELF-RESTRAINT ON ALL ITS CADRES, HAS ISSUED CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS ON;

- 1--STOPPING ALL MILITARY APPEARANCES AROUND THE CITY AND INSIDE IT,
- 2--REMOVING ALL ROAD BLOCKS,
- 3--STOPPING THE MOVEMENT OF FEDAYEEN ARMED VEHICLES, EXCEPT PATROLS OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE, AND
- 4--THE ARMED STRUGGLE COMMAND WILL IMPLEMENT THIS AND WILL SAFEGUARD THE PROPERTY AND SECURITY OF CITIZENS AND WILL ADOPT ALL NECESSARY MEASURES FOR THIS PURPOSE.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SAYS IT EXPECTS THE AUTHORITIES TO CARRY OUT WHAT THEY ANNOUNCED IN THEIR STATEMENT TODAY SO THAT THE ARMED FORCES AND THE FEDAYEEN UNITS CAN TAKE UP THEIR PLACES SIDE BY SIDE TO CONFRONT THE ENEMY AND DEFEND THE SANCTITY OF THIS HOMELAND.

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JORDANIAN DECISION ON MILITARY UNITS

AMMAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ARABIC 0700 GMT 5 SEP 70 M

(TEXT) AN OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN STATES THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS INSTRUCTED THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO PULL BACK THE MILITARY UNITS AROUND THE CAPITAL TO THEIR TRAINING CENTERS IN ORDER TO PUT AN END TO THE APPEARANCE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL NEAR THE CAPITAL AND THE APPEARANCE OF ARMED MEN FROM THE VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CITY. THIS IS IN ORDER TO FINALLY END THE STATE OF TENSION IN PUBLIC LIFE IN THE CAPITAL. THE GOVERNMENT IS CONFIDENT OF THE COOPERATION OF ALL SIDES FOR THE GENERAL INTEREST AND THE RESTORATION OF CALM AND SECURITY.

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AMMAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ARABIC 0628 GMT 5 SEP 70 M

(TEXT) THE PREMIER'S OFFICE CALLS ON ALL EMPLOYEES TO REPORT TO WORK AND TO CARRY OUT THEIR DUTIES AS USUAL. IT APPEALS TO ALL CITIZENS TO CARRY ON WITH THEIR DAILY ACTIVITY AS USUAL.

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

USINT CAIRO

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SUBJ PROSPECTS FOR JORDAN AFTER LATEST GOVT-FEDAYEEN CLASH

REF AMMAN 4300

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING DISTURBANCES OF PAST WEEK IN AMMAN, KING, GOJ, POLITICIANS AND RESPONSIBLE FEDAYEEN SEEM TO REALIZE THE NEED TO SEEK - AT LEAST TEMPORARILY - A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES. IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS A CONSIDERABLE NEGOTIATING EFFORT TOWARD THIS END WILL BE MADE BOTH IN CAIRO AND AMMAN. PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS THAT DISTRUST BETWEEN GOVT FEDAYEEN INCREASING; LINES BETWEEN GOVT AND FEDAYEEN HAVE BECOME MORE SHARPLY DRAWN, AND BOTH SIDES UNDER CONTINUING PRESSURES FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE EXTREME FACTIONS. DIFFICULTIES IN THE PEACE TALKS, FINALLY, COULD RAISE FEDAYEEN CAPABILITIES BACK TO - AND PERHAPS BEYOND - PREVIOUS HIGH OF JUNE 1973.

1. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT KING'S SPEECH [REDACTED] BROADCAST NIGHT OF SEP 3 WAS IN PART RESPONSE TO LATEST EXPRESSION VIEWS OF FEDAYEEN AS WELL AS TO EVENTS IN GENERAL OF PAST FEW DAYS. ACCORDING TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE STATEMENT PUBLISHED IN FATAH NEWSPAPER SEP 4 (BUTWHOSE CONTENTS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN TO GOJ IN MEETING YESTERDAY AFTERNOON), FEDAYEEN NOT PREPARED TO SEEK NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT "WITH A GOVT WHICH IS NOT EXERCISING

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ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS." KING'S EMPOWERING COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO EXERCISE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES" WE BELIEVE SPEAKS TO THIS POINT AND REFLECTS HIS GENUINE DESIRE FOR PEACEFUL POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION.

2. KING'S SPEECH, MOREOVER, COMES AT TIME WHEN POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY VARIOUS BODIES AND ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH GOJ AND FEDAYEEN IS REACHING A NEW PEAK. EXTRAORDINARY SESSION ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL SCHEDULED TO MEET SEP 5 IN CAIRO WILL DISCUSS THIS MATTER. SULAYMAN NABULSI'S "NATIONAL GROUPING" WHICH WAS DUE TO HOLD ANOTHER SESSION ON SEP 18 MAY NOW CONVENE EVEN EARLIER. PRESS ACCOUNTS CLAIM "NATIONAL CHARTER" TO BE DRAFTED ON THIS OCCASION. PAPERS ALSO CARRY ACCOUNT OF MEETING BETWEEN FEDAYEEN CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND A "NUMBER OF SENATORS AND DEPUTIES" MOST OF WHOM PRO-GOVT MODERATES. (DEPUTIES SEEM TO STRADDLE THE LINE BY CALLING FOR PEACE AND ORDER IN AMMAN AND ALSO AN END TO SHOOTING IN CITY BY GOVT FORCES. ON SEP 3, ALSO, KING BY ROYAL DECREE ESTABLISHED "PRIVY COUNCIL" TO "ASSIST KING AND OFFER ADVICE AND CONSULTATION." COUNCIL INCLUDES ALL FORMER PRIME MINISTERS (TELL, TALHOUNI, MUFTI, NABULSI); PRIME MINISTER RIFA'I; HEAD OF ROYAL DIWAN ZAID RIFAI; SPEAKER OF HOUSE IRAIQAT; FORMER CHIEF OF DIWAN TARAWNEH; ROYAL CHAMBERLAIN FIELD MARSHAL MAJALI; AND CHIEF OF STAFF AL-JAZI.

3. WE CONSIDER KING, IN ESTABLISHING PRIVY COUNCIL, MAY BE PREPARING ANOTHER POLITICAL LINE OF DEFENSE TO WHICH HE COULD WITHDRAW IF DISCUSSIONS IN OTHER FORUMS FRUITLESS. HUSSEIN MAY BE HOPEFUL THAT OUT OF THIS WELTER OF NEGOTIATIONS SOME ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION MAY EMERGE TO PRECLUDE HIS HAVING TO USE FORCE TO BRING FEDAYEEN INTO LINE. (HE PROBABLY DOES NOT DOUBT WILLINGNESS OR CAPABILITY OF JAA TO DO SO, BUT WOULD WISH TO AVOID NARROWING HIS POLITICAL BASE BY RESORTING TO A MILITARY SOLUTION.)

4. PROBLEM AS WE SEE IT, HOWEVER, IS THAT AS A RESULT OF LAST FEW DAYS DISTRUST BETWEEN GOVT AND FEDAYEEN SHARPENED AND ISSUE THEMSELVES HAVE BECOME MORE INTRACTABLE. IT NOW MORE DIFFICULT FOR

EITHER SIDE TO SATISFY MINIMAL DEMANDS OF OTHER. PALACE OFFICIAL TOLD EMBOFF SEPT 3 THAT PALACE FELT ITSELF IN STRONG POSITION. KING'S GREATEST PROBLEM, HE SAID, WAS FENDING OFF PRESSURES FROM RIGHT-WING LOYALISTS TO MOP UP FEDAYEEN ONCE AND FOR ALL. WE OURSELVES THINK THERE MAY BE SOME HAIR TRIGGERS ON GOVT SIDE

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AND RELIABLE FOREIGN EMBASSY SOURCE STATES THAT SEVEN BRIGADIER ZAID BIN SHAKIR SURPRISED BY SPONTANEITY ARMY'S RESPONSE TO FEDAYEEN FIRING ON NIGHT OF AUG 31.

5. ON OTHER HAND, IT IS CLEAR THAT EXTREMEIST AND IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS SUCH AS PFLP AND PDFLP HAVE NOTHING TO GAIN AND EVERYTHING TO LOSE BY EITHER PEACE OR GENUINE GOJ-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENTS. IT IS PROBABLY LATTER OF THE TWO WHICH, BOTH ON NIGHT OF AUG 31 AND IN NEXT DAY'S ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, HOPED TO SET OFF ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN GOVT AND FEDAYEEN. IN SUCH A CLASH FATAH WOULD BE SEVERELY HURT AND MORAL PRESTIGE OF GOVT DROP TO ALL TIME LOW; RESULTING SITUATION COULD WORK TO ADVANTAGE OF IDEOLOGICAL EXTREMISTS.

6. WE BELIEVE THAT POSSIBILITY OF INCIDENTS ESCALATING OUT OF CONTROL HAS LESSENER IN PAST FEW DAYS. WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, COMPLETELY DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY THAT EXTREMISTS, HAVING FAILED IN THEIR PROVOCATIONS AGAINST ARMY HEADQUARTERS AND KING, MIGHT FALL BACK ON MORE VULNERABLE TARGETS SUCH AS FOREIGN MISSIONS AMMAN.

7. FINALLY, IT WORTH EMPHASIZING THAT UAR'S ACCEPTANCE OF ROGERS' PROPOSAL HELPED PRODUCE LEAST FAVORABLE CLIMATE IN PAST THREE YEARS FOR FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS. BUT IF CEASE-FIRE BREAKS DOWN, OR JARRING TALKS APPEAR DEADLOCKED, FEDAYEEN INFLUENCE AS FORCE WITHIN JORDAN AND IRRITANT TO JORDANIAN/ISRAELI RELATIONS - MAY INCREASE BEYOND PREVIOUS HIGH IN JUNE 1970. GP-3.

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AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH  
AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

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SUBJECT: GVN AND SECOND DJAKARTA CONFERENCE.

1. LOCAL PRESS SEPTEMBER 3 CARRIED INTERVIEW WITH FONMIN LAM  
IN WHICH HE REPORTEDLY SAID GVN WOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE  
IN CALLING FOR SECOND DJAKARTA CONFERENCE. LAM HAD EXPLAINED  
THAT NEW MEETING WAS DESIRABLE IN VIEW OF FAILURE OF DJAKARTA  
THREE TO RESOLVE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM.

## 2. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY BY POL COUNSELOR SEPTEMBER 4, LAM

SAID AT DJAKARTA HE HAD ARGUED THAT CONFERENCE WAS USELESS WITHOUT ADEQUATE FOLLOW-UP AND HAD URGED THAT REFERENCE TO SECOND CONFERENCE BE PUT IN FINAL COMMUNIQUE. MALIK AND SUHARTO HAD COUNTERED THAT, WHILE THEY AGREED ANOTHER MEETING WOULD PROBABLY PROVE NECESSARY, SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THIS IN COMMUNIQUE MIGHT UNDERMINE EFFORTS OF DJAKARTA THREE DELEGATION. LAM NOW FELT TIME WAS PROPITIOUS TO RAISE MATTER AGAIN AND HAD THEREFORE INSTRUCTED SVN EMBASSIES IN DJAKARTA, KUALA LUMPUR AND TOKYO TO SOUND OUT THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS ON HOLDING ANOTHER CONFERENCE. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN

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WHY HE SIMULTANEOUSLY ANNOUNCED HIS VIEWS TO PRESS.

3. COMMENT. WHILE WE BELIEVE GVN'S OBJECTIVE OF KEEPING DJAKARTA SPIRIT ALIVE HAS MERIT, DIFFICULT TO ASSESS FROM HERE WHETHER NEW CONFERENCE WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE OR FEASIBLE WAY OF DOING SO. IN ANY CASE, WE DO NOT THINK LEAD TAKEN BY GVN WOULD HELP PROSPECTS. IF OTHER DJAKARTA PARTICIPANTS INCLINED TOWARD NEW INITIATIVE, WOULD SEEM PREFERABLE FOR ONE OR MORE OF NEUTRALS TO BE IN FRONT. HOW VIGOROUSLY GVN INTENDS TO PURSUE THIS ISSUE MAY DEPEND TO LARGE DEGREE ON RESULTS OF ITS CURRENT SOUNDINGS. WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS FOR PURPOSES OF POSSIBLE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS HERE.

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
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
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JOINT EMBASSY/DAO MESSAGE

SUBJ: CAMBODIAN SIT REP 7 SEPTEMBER 5

## 1. LUSAKA NON-ALLIGNED CONFERENCE

RADIO PEKING ANNOUNCED ARRIVAL OF TWO MAN DELEGATION IN LUSAKA FROM SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT. HEAD OF DELEGATION IS SARIN CHHAK, "MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS", WHILE "MINISTER OF POPULATION EDUCATION AND YOUTH" CHAN YOURAN IS OTHER MEMBER. AFK PUBLISHED FOREIGN PRESS REPORTS REPORTING THAT GOC FONMIN WAS TO ARRIVE IN LUSAKA TODAY.

## 2. VISIT OF AMERICAN YOUTH DELEGATION

A. LOCAL PRESS [ ] REPORTED HEAVILY ON VISIT OF "AMERICAN YOUTH FOR A JUST PEACE." YESTERDAY DELEGATION RECEIVED MILITARY BRIEFING; VISITED MILITARY HOSPITAL, WHERE THAT SAW VC/NVNA WOUNDED AS WELL AS WOUNDED STUDENTS; VISITED REFUGEE CENTER; AND HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH INTELLECTUAL GROUP. AMONG QUESTION WHICH THEY ASKED INTELLECTUALS CONCERNED SIHANOUK'S POPULARITY AMONG PEASANTS, CIA INVOLVEMENT IN DISMISSAL OF SIHANOUK (INTELLECTUALS FLATLY DENIED), AND QUESTION OF THE REPUBLIC. AMERICAN GROUP URGED INTELLECTUALS TO SEND DELEGATIONS TO VISIT US.

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B. UNIVERSITY OF BEAUX ARTS STUDENTS HOSTED GROUP AT DINNER TO WHICH SOME EMBOFFS INVITED. FOLLOWING CAMBODIAN STUDENTS PRESENTATION OF CLASSIC AND FOLD DANCING, AMERICAN GROUP CALLED TO STAGE AND CREDITABLY SANG FOLK SONGS. FOR FINALE AMERICAN GROUP OFFERED SONG, WHICH THEY IDENTIFIED AS A CIVIL RIGHTS SONG, WHICH THEY SAID WAS APPLICABLE TO CAMBODIA. CAMBODIAN AUDIENCE APPLAUDED ENTHUSIASTICALLY AND JOINED INsofar AS POSSIBLE IN SINGING "WE SHALL OVERCOME."

## 3. MILITARY TRIBUNAL INVALIDATES DEATH SENTENCE AGAINST SON NGOC THANH

SON NGOC THANH WHO WAS CONDEMNED TO DEATH IN ABSENTIA BY A MILITARY TRIBUNAL DURING REGIME OF SIHANOUK, PETITIONED MILITARY

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TRIBUNAL FOR REEXAMINATION OF HIS CASE. PETITION WAS ACCEDPTED AND SON NGOC THANH TESTIFIED ON SEPTEMBER 4, DENYING ACCUSATIONS MADE BY SIHANOUK. MILITARY TRIBUNAL DECIDED THAT SON NGOC THANH'S PETITION WOULD BE ACCEPTED, THAT THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 1969 WAS INVALID AND THAT SON NGOC THANH WAS EXCULPATED.

4. CAMBODIA TO BECOME MEMBER OF SEAMES

AMONG DECISION TAKEN AT WEEKLY CABINET MEETING WAS APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE FOR CAMBODIAN MEMEBERSHIP SEAMES.

5. MILITARY J2, J3.

A. DURING PAST 24 HOURS VC/NVNA HARASSING ACTIVITY INCREASED IN THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN PROVINCES. THIS ACTIVITY INCLUDED ATTACKS BY FIRE, RAIDS ON VILLAGES AND AMBUSHES OF CIVILIAN CONVOYS. VC/NVNA PRESSURE CONTINUES IN SRANG AND SAANG, BUT CAMBODIANS CONTINUE TO HOLD THESE VILLAGES.

B. FANK POSITIONS NORTH AND WEST OF SIEM REAP TOWN WERE ATTACKED DURING THE DAY. ATTACK WAS OF GREATER INTENSITY THAN ANY TIME SINCE JULY.

6. PRESS BRIEFING

PRESS BRIEFER REPORTED ON ATTACKS ON SAANG AND SRANG. HE SAID THAT THE ENEMY CONTINUED LIMITED ATTACKS AND SPORADIC ACTION. HE SAID THAT FANK TROOPS IN SWEEP OPERATIONS OFTEN PRECIPITATED FIGHTS WHICH SPOILED ENEMY PLANS FOR ATTACK.


7. LOCAL PRESS

A. KOS SANTEPHEAP EDITORIAL URGES LUSAKA NAC NOT TO ACCEPT SIHANOUK GOVT IN EXILE. EDITORIAL REPEATS FAMILIAR THEMES AND DOES NOT OFFER ANYTHING NEW.

B. PROJCH KHMER COMMENTS AGAIN ABOUT THE FEUD BETWEEN SIM VAR AND THE CAMBODIAN SPECIAL MILITARY REGIMENT COMMANDER. (SIM VAR ATTACKED THE NEWSPAPER AND ACCUSED IT OF TAKING SIDES AGAINST HIM.) PROJCH KHMER DENIED IT IS TAKING SIDES BUT THAT NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRES THAT THE FIGHT BETWEEN THE "TWO ELEPHANTS" BE SETTLED.

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